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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation studies the relationship between time preference and addictive 
consumption. I first provide the theoretical background and the simulation results of an 
intertemporal choices model; then discuss the experimental approach to study the 
relationship between time preference and addictive consumption in the lab setting. From 
there I draw conclusions of the relationship between time preference and addictive 
consumption. The main contribution of the dissertation is to add new empirical evidence 
to the literature of addictive consumption and time preference. 
 
In the first chapter, I give an overview of this topic and address the importance of the issue, 
and then I provide an extensive literature review in this area. 
 
In the second chapter, I illustrate my baseline model, simulate a life cycle intertemporal 
choices problem and illustrate optimal consumption paths under different circumstances. 
 
In the third chapter, I use an incentivized consumption game to simulate addictive 
behavior in the lab setting and correlate the subjects’ behaviors with their time preference 
by using various measures in the experiment. 
 
In the last chapter, I conclude this dissertation and address some problems for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2013, a congressional proposal has been raised to legalize marijuana while at the same 
time imposing a 60 percent excise tax on junk food, candy, and soda. This proposal drives 
public attention on a long-standing policy debate over government's role on the regulation 
of the consumption of addictive goods. The category of addictive goods has been 
expanded in past decades. It not only includes traditional addictive goods such as cigarette, 
alcoholic drink, illegal drugs, but also the goods that were not traditionally viewed as 
addictive goods, such as video games, junk food, online gambling and porn. The 
consumption of these goods has not only brought disutility to the consumer itself, but also 
brought negative externality to the whole society. For instance, according to MADD, the 
nation's largest nonprofit working to protect families from drunk driving and underage 
drinking, every 53 minutes on average, someone is killed in a drunk driving crash (9,878 
people in total in 2011).1 Therefore, it provides room for the government to step in and 
regulate the consumption of addictive goods. 
 
Given the importance of government regulation on addictive consumption, there is huge 
debate among policymakers over the ways to regulate it. One possible way is through 
taxation, or the so-called sin tax. In US, the consumption of cigarette and alcohol has been 
taxed at both the federal and state levels. According to Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and 
Trade Bureau of the United States Department of the Treasury, roughly 21 billion were 
collected in 2011 in excise taxes rightfully due to the federal government. On the other 
hand, the government also uses other methods to regulate the consumption of addictive 
goods. For instance, marijuana has been viewed illegal in 32 out of 50 states in US. Some 
                                                 
1 http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving 
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states have restricted the sale of certain type of alcoholic drinks during certain hours and 
in certain places. For instance, according to the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, 
a wine only package store that holds beer license may not sell wine containing more than 
17 percent alcohol by volume on Sunday or after 10pm on any day.2 
 
Finally, the consumption of some addictive goods is not restricted, but whether or not to 
regulate them are constantly under policy debate. For instance, the so-called fat tax, a tax 
on junk food has been introduced by Denmark in 2011 and is also under debate in US 
under the hope that such tax could help fight the obesity problem in US.3 
 
Despite the huge social impact of taxation on addictive goods and the various public 
policies toward the consumption of those goods, economists have provided mixed results 
on both theoretical and empirical evidence over this topic. A growing literature of models 
of addictive behavior are developed in recent years to help explain those contradictory 
results (Becker & Murphy, 1988; Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 
1999b). Yet no consensus has been reached in even the basic assumptions of modeling 
addictive consumption. Therefore the first step towards reaching a consensus is to 
understand and model the cause of addictive consumption, thus the aim of this dissertation.  
 
1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Economic theory of time discounting and addictive behavior 
Time discounting is one key determinant in solving intertemporal choice problems. 
Economists have been using the discounted utility model (DU) to model time discounting 
since Samuelson (1937). It assumes that consumers discount future consumption at a 
constant discount rate. Despite its popularity, the discounted utility model has also been 
                                                 
2 http://www.tabc.state.tx.us/faq/general.asphours 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fattax 
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criticized. One prominent issue is the time inconsistency problem. Empirical research on 
both humans and a variety of organisms has shown that temporal discount functions are 
not exponential. Ainslie (1975) develops a model called “hyperbolic discounting” to 
explain the anomalies in discounted utility. The problem of the hyperbolic discounting 
model is that its mathematics is complicated. Laibson later developed the model of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. It captures the essence of hyperbolic discounting, yet in a way that 
is much easier to track mathematically.  
 
Besides time discounting, other important mechanisms also impact intertemporal 
decision-making. Berns, Laibson, and Loewenstein (2007) point out that there are three 
other mechanisms playing important roles in intertemporal choice problems: anticipation, 
the physiological arousal associated with anticipation of the outcome; self-control, the 
willpower to restrain from short-run temptations and representation, differences in context 
or in the way that a decision is “framed” or cognitively construed. These three mechanisms 
have drawn the attention of economists. The interactions among different mechanisms are 
also worth studying. 
 
Among all intertemporal problems, the phenomenon of under-saving has been studied 
most extensively by economists. The other side of the under-saving problem is the 
problem of over-consumption. One extreme case and also a possible cause of over-
consumption is addictive consumption.  
 
The best-known economic model of addictive consumption is by Becker and Murphy 
(1988). In their model, they assume addictive consumption is chosen by rational forward-
looking agents who fully recognize the future damage of their current addictive behavior. 
Their model, also very controversial, captures some important factors of addiction. The 
assumptions imposed are: 1) past consumption lowers the present utility from the same 
consumption level, or the tolerance effect; 2) the reinforcement effect, i.e., an increase in 
past consumption increases present and future consumption. In their model, they adopt 
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exponential discounting, so the addiction is only caused by the above feature of the good 
itself.  
 
Another group of addiction models assume the decision maker (DM) has time inconsistent 
preference. For example, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) study the relationship between 
addiction and self-control. By imposing hyperbolic discounting on a simple binary 
addiction consumption model, they are able to show that individuals tend to over consume 
addictive products. Over time, even a person with mild self-control problem can hurt 
himself severely. Gruber and Koszegi (2000) incorporate hyperbolic discounting into the 
model of rational addiction. They find that imposing the assumption of hyperbolic 
discounting change the policy implications would change dramatically because of the 
“internalities” imposed by addicts on themselves.  
 
Braun and Vanini (2003) go one step further by assuming time preference is endogenous 
for addictive consumption. They distinguish habitual and addictive consumption by 
assuming an addict’s time preference depends on the consumption history, whereas a non-
addict’s time preference rate is just an exogenously fixed constant. Therefore, once a DM 
becomes addicted, he or she will develop a stronger impatience or become more present-
oriented.   
 
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) develop a model of addiction that is based on a cue-triggered 
decision processes. In their model, addicts have two modes, a “hot” mode and a “cold” 
mode. Each period, the addict has a stochastic probability of entering the hot mode. He 
will always use the substance in the hot mode. In the cold mode, he evaluates the benefits 
and costs of any possibility of current and future outcomes and has a discounting rate for 
future payoffs. Therefore, the DM’s time preference is a combination of the exponential 
discounting in the cold mode and the myopic case in the hot mode.  
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Fudenberg and Levine (2006) adopt a dual-self approach to study a DM’s impulsiveness 
control problem. In their model, they assume a long-run self who has a constant time 
discounting factor each period and a short-run self who only considers his utility in the 
current period. The so-called dual-self model has been used in a lot of economic problems 
and addictive consumption is one of them. 
 
1.2.2 Experimental evidence about addictive consumption  
There are few experiments conducted to study addiction, mostly due to the fact that it is 
very hard to mimic addictive behaviors in the laboratory setting. One of a few economic 
experiments to study addiction is done by Fehr and Zych (1998). They test rational 
addiction theory in the lab by adopting an induced preference approaching, i.e., they 
impose a payoff function that mimics the utility function as of Becker and Murphy (1988) 
on the subjects and make subjects fully aware of their own utility function. The utility 
function also determines the payoff of the subjects in the lab, therefore providing 
incentives for subjects to maximize their utility. Subjects’ behaviors deviate significantly 
from the prediction of the rational addiction theory in the lab.  
 
Richards and Hamilton (2012) study the relationship between obesity and hyperbolic 
discounting. They conduct an experiment to test whether the discount rate for individuals 
who engage in harmful addictive behaviors differ from those who do not. Their results 
show that the discount rates are quasi-hyperbolic in shape and addictive behaviors such as 
obesity and drinking are positively linked to the discount rate. The difference between 
their paper and ours is they use survey data as a measure of addictive behavior versus we 
us an incentivized experiment to capture individuals’ addictive behaviors. 
 
1.2.3 Experimental evidence about time discounting 
The literature on estimating time discounting, on the other hand, is much larger. Coller 
and Williams (1999) is among the first experiment to estimate time preference. They 
designed an experiment in which one person is randomly chosen from the subject pool to 
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receive a large amount of payment (over $500). The subject has to choose between 
payment in one month or in 3 months. The experiment also has several treatments; for 
instance, provide interest rate information to subjects. 
 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) argue that the experiment-induced time inconsistent 
behaviors could be due to the unmeasured risk of the future. They conduct a time 
preference experiment in which the risk of future payment is tightly controlled and find 
there is no time inconsistency.     
 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) argue that the standard elicitation techniques for 
measuring time preference is biased because they use linear preference instead of concave 
ones. Therefore, they propose the Convex Time Budget (CTB) method, along with a 
structural estimation method, to measure time preference and estimate the parameters of 
a utility function. Their results show that the annual discount rates are substantially lower 
than those obtained in the previous literature. 
 
Wölbert and Riedl (2013) also conducted a time preference experiment but they did not 
find any present bias in the experiment. In addition, they used the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale to measure impulsiveness and found discount rates elicited in a monetary 
intertemporal choice task are highly correlated for three different intertemporal choice sets, 
and they observed good test-retest correlations for discount rates over an interval of 5–10 
weeks. 
 
Arya, Eckel, and Wichman (2013) studies the relationship between credit scores and 
preferences such as impulsivity, time preference, risk attitude, and trustworthiness. They 
find that credit scores are positively related to time preference (i.e., more patient subjects 
have better credit score) and negatively related to impulsivity. In their paper, they also 
adopt a time preference measure that is a variation on the “multiple price list” approach 
of Coller and Williams (1999). We use a variation on their measure too. 
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In addition to economists, some psychologists also address similar issue from their 
perspective. Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2012) use several experiments to show that 
over-consumption is related to how people allocate their attention. In experiment 1, 
subjects play “Wheel of Fortune” and they are randomly selected into rich group, which 
has 280 guesses and poor group, which has 84 guesses. Later they are given a test to 
measure cognitive fatigue.  It turns out the poor are more fatigued despite spending less 
time on guesses. Although it does not directly related to my topic, it does provide some 
insight into the reason consumers may over-consume addictive goods. 
 
There are also experiments conducted to test the relationship between subjects’ behaviors 
in intertemporal choice games and time preference. Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger 
(2013) study individual time preference for a real effort task. In their experiment, they 
introduce a longitudinal design asking subjects to allocate and subsequently reallocate 
units of effort through time. They find limited evidence of present bias in choices over 
monetary payments and substantial present bias in choices over effort. Moreover, at price 
zero roughly 60% of subjects prefer commitment to flexibility. And individuals who 
demand commitment are significantly more present-biased in effort than those who do not.  
 
Brown, Chua, and Camerer (2009) conduct an experiment in which thirsty subjects are 
allowed to either receive a beverage immediately or with a delay. Those who receive the 
beverage immediately over-consume more compared to those who receive it with a delay, 
which is consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. The above experiments, 
although not directly related to addictive behavior, show the importance of present bias in 
intertemporal decision making. 
 
1.2.4 Indication on taxation problems from current literature 
The most influential model of addictive behavior is the "rational addiction" theory 
developed by Becker and Murphy (1988). The basic assumption of their model is that 
consumers are rational forward-looking agents so that they fully recognized the future 
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damage of their current addictive consumption, yet still willing to consume the addictive 
goods. For example, a smoker who chooses to smoke one more cigarette is fully aware of 
the future health cost as well as increased addiction to smoking caused by smoking one 
more cigarette. However, according to the model of rational addiction, by making the 
choice of smoking one more cigarette, the smoker believes the benefit of smoking is 
greater than the cost of it. Given this assumption, an optimal taxation on addictive goods 
for government need to take consideration of negative externalities of such consumption, 
but not negative welfare effect for the addict himself or herself, as that individual is already 
pursuing his or her maximum discounted utility. Therefore, it suggests a fairly low optimal 
tax rate for addictive goods that has a low external cost, for example, cigarettes and a high 
tax rate for goods that has a high external cost, for example, alcoholic drinks. 
 
The model of rational addiction has been supported by some empirical evidence. For 
instance, according to this model, anticipation of future increases in price also reduce 
current consumption of additive goods. Gruber and Koszegi (2000) show some empirical 
evidence that future tax raise does decrease current consumption of cigarette. But it has 
also raised some controversial empirical results. Auld and Grootendorst (2004) show, 
however, that it is somewhat problematic to use aggregate data to study the empirical 
evidence of the rational addiction model. Yet more controversial results come from 
evidence found in economic laboratory. One big objection is that more and more 
laboratory results show that individual preferences are time inconsistent. For example, 
when subjects in the laboratory are asked whether to choose a dollar today or three dollars 
tomorrow, a large portion of subjects take the offer today. On the other hand, when asked 
whether to take a dollar in one year or three dollars in one year and a day, most subjects 
would take three dollars instead Thaler (1991). It contradicts with the basic assumption in 
rational addiction model, that individual preferences are time consistent. Based on the 
growing evidence on time inconsistent preference, Ainslie (1991) developed the model of 
hyperbolic discounting. He argues that the discount rate for shorter time period is higher 
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than the discount rate for longer time period for most people. Therefore there exists a 
conflict between one’s preference today and the preferences in the future. 
 
The model of hyperbolic discounting was later developed to study the self-control problem 
with in an individual relative to time-consistent preferences, a person makes choices that 
he or she might regret in the future (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2002). The 
welfare implication of the time-inconsistent model of addiction is also quite different from 
that of rational-choice model. Unlike the rational-choice model, a person with self-control 
problems would hurt herself by consuming too much addictive goods. In other words, 
consumption of addictive goods not only causes negative externality, but also negative 
internality to the addict herself. 
 
Time-inconsistent model of addiction also has different implication over optimal taxation 
problem compared to rational addiction model. Of all, the optimal tax rate should be higher 
as negative internality has been taken. Gruber and Koszegi (2000) estimate the optimal 
tax rate of cigarette should be at least one dollar higher in their model compared to the 
rational addition model. They also provide empirical evidence to support their argument 
that government policy should take consideration of the smokers’ internality that they 
posed on themselves.  
 
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) propose a different kind of addiction model. Their model is 
based on the premises that consumption of addictive goods is often triggered by some cues. 
Their model suggests an optimal tax rule is different for different addictive substance. 
Interestingly, they point out for substances that are highly addicted, a subsidy instead of 
taxation is optimal. Such goods include cocaine and heroin. On the other hand, for 
substance that are inexpensive and used regularly, but become addictive when the cue 
trigger effect is established, it is optimal to tax; for instance, coffee, cigarettes and alcohol. 
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In Chapter II, we adopt the model of rational addiction developed by Becker and Murphy 
(1988). The simple theoretical framework has proven to be useful in explaining a lot of 
phenomena related to additive consumption. We use this framework to conduct a 
simulation of negative and positive addiction consumption paths. It also serves as a useful 
theoretical background for the experiments we conducted in Chapter III． 
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CHAPTER II 
 INTERTEMPORAL CHOICES MODEL OF ADDICTIVE COMSUMPTION: 
THEORY AND SIMULATION 
 
To better understand the intertemporal choice associated with addictive consumption, this 
paper presents a model of addictive consumption and provides simulation results of the 
model of rational addiction. We divide addictive consumption into two categories: 
negative addiction and positive addiction. For negative addiction, examples include 
consumption of alcohol, tobacco and so on. On the positive side one might imagine 
beginning an exercise regime, which is unpleasant to begin with, but then becomes 
pleasurably addictive and has long term benefits.  
 
The important features of the utility function of addiction are the same between negative 
addiction and positive addiction: past consumption lowers the present utility from the 
same consumption level, or the tolerance effect; and increases the marginal utility of future 
consumption, or the reinforcement effects. These two distinct features separate the utility 
function of addictive goods from the utility function of normal non-addictive goods. 
 
The marginal utility of current consumption, however, is different between positive 
addiction and negative addiction. For the case of negative addiction, the marginal utility 
of current consumption is always positive. Therefore, one enjoys the current consumption 
of addictive goods. For the case of positive addiction, the marginal utility of current 
consumption is first negative, then positive. One might imagine beginning an exercise 
regime, which is unpleasant to begin with, but then becomes pleasurably addictive and has 
long term benefits.  
 
One can also think of addiction as a special case of the rich set of habit formation utility 
functions. As with a habit formation utility function, current utility depends on past 
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consumption. However, a habit formation utility function does not necessarily satisfy the 
tolerance effect. This distinction in the utility functions of positive addiction is important 
in defining the consumption path of addictive consumption and separates itself from the 
general habit formation consumption path. 
 
In this chapter, I apply the model of rational addiction to study a life-cycle intertemporal 
choice problem. I first present the model, and then give simulation results of the model.  
 
2.1 The baseline model 
Following Becker and Murphy (1988), the utility of an individual at period t, 𝑢𝑡 , is a 
function of his current consumption 𝑐𝑡 and the stock of previous consumption 𝑆𝑡:  
𝑢𝑡 = 𝑢(𝑐𝑡, 𝑆𝑡)  (2.1) 
𝑆𝑡 denotes the level of addiction and can be written as: 
𝑆𝑡 = (1 − δ) 𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑡−1 , (2.2) 
Where δ denotes the rate of depreciation. Therefore, his lifetime utility would be given by, 
𝑈𝑇 = ∑ (1 + 𝜎)
𝑇−𝑡+1𝑇
𝑡=1 𝑢(𝑐𝑡, 𝑆𝑡) , (2.3) 
Where 𝜎 denotes his rate of time preference and  𝑇 is his lifetime. 
 
Assume 𝐴𝑡 is the DM’s wealth at the beginning of period t, the interest rate is 𝑟, the price 
of the consumption good is 𝑝𝑐 and the income per period is given by 𝑤. Each period, the 
individual has to make the decision of how much to spend on consumption goods 𝑐𝑡 and 
how much to save to the next period so that he can increase his wealth at the beginning of 
the next period 𝐴𝑡+1. The intertemporal budget constraint is thus given by, 
𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡 +
𝐴𝑡+1
1+𝑟
− 𝐴𝑡 ≤ 𝑤, 𝑡 = 1, … . 𝑇. (2.4) 
So a rational individual chooses a consumption sequence (𝑐1, 𝑐2, … 𝑐𝑇) to maximize 𝑈𝑇 
subject to (2.2) and (2.4) and 𝑐𝑡 ≥ 0 and 𝐴𝑇+1 ≥ 0 . 
 
The above utility function has the following important features,  
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𝜕𝑢𝑡
𝜕𝑆𝑡
≡ 𝑢𝑠 < 0  (2.5) 
𝜕2𝑢𝑡/𝜕𝑐𝑡𝜕𝑆𝑡 ≡ 𝑢𝑐𝑠 > 0 (2.6) 
The first equation shows past consumption lowers the present utility from the same 
consumption level, or the tolerance effect. The second equation shows past consumption 
increases the marginal utility of future consumption, or the reinforcement effect. These 
two distinct features distinguish the utility function of addictive goods from the utility 
function of normal non-addictive goods. 
 
To simplify the problem, we adopt the quadratic form of the utility function: 
u(ct, St) = a0 + acct +
acc
2
ct
2 + aSSt +
ass
2
St
2 + acsctSt (2.7)       
Therefore we have, 
𝑢𝑠 = 𝑎𝑆 + 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑡 (2.8) 
𝑢𝑐 = 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑆𝑡 (2.9) 
𝑢𝑐𝑠 = 𝑎𝑐𝑠 (2.10) 
 
Since the reinforcement effect requires 𝑢𝑐𝑠 > 0, as long as 𝑎𝑐𝑠 > 0, the utility function 
satisfies the reinforcement effect. The tolerance effect requires 𝑢𝑠 < 0.  Therefore, it 
depends on the value of the parameters as well as current consumption and addiction level.   
 
As for the case of positive addiction, everything else remains the same except for equation 
2.5.  Here we assume, 
𝜕𝑢𝑡
𝜕𝑆𝑡
≡ 𝑢𝑠 > 0  (2.11) 
 
2.2 Simulation results of optimal paths of addiction  
To start, we first provide a benchmark for the optimal consumption of normal goods. The 
parameters of the utility function are set as follows: 𝑎0 = 0, 𝑎𝑐 = 0.6, 𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 0, 𝑎𝑆 =
0, 𝑎𝑆𝑆 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑆 = 6 ∗ 10
−5. The parameters are set in the way that the utility function 
is concave as 𝑢𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 0 . The other parameters are set as follows: T=30, 𝛿=0.1, 
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r=𝜎=0.03, w=10, 𝑝𝑐=1, 𝐴1=0 and 𝑆1=0. Figure 1 shows the optimal consumption path 
for normal goods. The reason that the consumption path is flat is because there is no impact 
of prior consumption on the marginal utility of current consumption and the interest rate 
is set equal to the discount rate. Therefore, there is no incentive for consumers to change 
their consumption level over time. 
 
  
Figure 1 Optimal consumption path for normal goods 
 
 
 
Figure 2 gives an optimal consumption path for negative addiction. The parameters of the 
utility function are set as follows: 𝑎0 = 0, 𝑎𝑐 = 0.6, 𝑎𝑐𝑐 = −0.01, 𝑎𝑆 = −0.06, 𝑎𝑆𝑆 =
−6 ∗ 10−6 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑆 = 6 ∗ 10
−5. The parameters are set in the way that the utility function 
is strictly concave as 𝑢𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑐𝑐 < 0 and the assumptions of rational addiction model are 
met. The other parameters are set as follows: T=30, 𝛿=0.1, r=𝜎=0.03, w=10, 𝑝𝑐=1, 𝐴1=0 
and 𝑆1=0. 
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Figure 2 Optimal consumption path for negative addiction 
 
 
 
One can tell from Figure 2 that the optimal consumption path for negative addiction is 
gradually increasing in a 30-period life-cycle. The marginal utility of current consumption 
is positive, but decreases with an increase in past consumption.  
 
Now we give an example of positive addiction in Figure 3. In this case, the parameters of 
the utility function are set as follows: 𝑎0 = 0, 𝑎𝑐 = −0.06, 𝑎𝑐𝑐 = −0.01, aS =
−0.06, aSS = −6 ∗ 10
−6 and acS = 6 ∗ 10
−4.  Compared with the case of negative 
addiction, now ac is negative instead of positive. This is because in the positive addiction 
case, marginal utility of consumption is first negative, then becomes positive. The 
parameters are set to ensure the feature of positive addiction, i.e., 𝑢𝑠 > 0 as well as the 
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concavity of the utility function given by 𝑢𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑐𝑐 < 0. The other parameters are set the 
same as the negative addiction case: T=30, 𝛿=0.1, r=𝜎=0.03, w=10, 𝑝𝑐=1, 𝐴1=0 and 
𝑆1=0.  
 
 
Figure 3 Optimal consumption path for positive addiction 
 
 
 
The optimal path of positive addiction starts from a level significantly higher than zero, 
increases first and then declines after it has reached the maximum point. The marginal 
utility of current consumption is negative first, and gradually increases to a positive level. 
This suggests that to get into an optimal path of positive addiction, one has to start with a 
higher level of consumption in order for the marginal utility level to be positive. 
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Now we compare the case of positive addiction with habit formation in Figure 4. The 
parameters of the utility function are set as follows: 𝑎0 = 0, 𝑎𝑐 = 0.6, 𝑎𝑐𝑐 = −0.01, 𝑎𝑆 =
0.01, 𝑎𝑆𝑆 = −6 ∗ 10
−6 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑆 = 6 ∗ 10
−5.  The other parameters are set as follows: 
T=30, 𝛿=0.1, r=𝜎=0.03, w=10, 𝑝𝑐=1, 𝐴1=0 and 𝑆1=0. Compared to the previous case, 
the major change in the parameter setting is that aS is positive instead of negative. As a 
result, the marginal utility of addiction level is positive. In this case, the reinforcement 
effect still exists, but the tolerance effect does not. In other words, past consumption no 
longer lowers the present utility from the same consumption level. Because of the absence 
of the tolerance effect, the optimal consumption path is declining all the way in a 30-period 
life as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Optimal consumption path for habit formation 
 
 
 
2.3 Simulation results of variations of negative addiction  
To further explore the variation of different parameters, we look at changes in the optimal 
consumption path with changes in the discount rate 𝜎. Figure 5 shows that the lower the 
discount rate, the more tilted consumption is towards the end.  It says a higher discount 
rate increases current consumption relative to later consumption. 
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Figure 5 Change in optimal path with the discount rate 
 
 
 
Next, we look at the change in the consumption path with respect to the depreciation rate 
of the addiction level S. Not surprisingly, the higher the depreciation rate, the greater past 
consumption would decrease future utility, therefore the less consumers will consume at 
the end of the life cycle. Figure 6 shows that a higher depreciation rate raises current 
consumption and flatten the consumption path, lowering consumption at the end of life. 
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Figure 6 Change in optimal path with the depreciation rate 
 
 
 
Figure 7 below illustrates the change in optimal consumption with a change in price. It 
turns out the optimal consumption path is not sensitive at all to the change in price, at least 
compared with other parameters. When the price is higher, consumers consume slightly 
less at the beginning, and more at the end. 
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Figure 7 Change in the optimal path with price 
 
 
 
Figure 8 gives the optimal paths with changes in the interest rate r. From the graph, the 
change in optimal path is relatedly more sensitive to the change in r than the change in 
price. The higher the interest rate, the more consumers consume at the end and less at the 
beginning.  
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Figure 8 Change in optimal path with the interest rate 
 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
In this paper, we provide simulation results of an intertemporal choice model. It is shown 
that to achieve an optimal consumption path for goods that are negatively addicting, 
consumers start with relatively small amount of consumption at first, and gradually 
increase their consumption level towards the end. To achieve an optimal consumption path 
for goods or activities that are positively addicting, consumers start with a relatively high 
initial consumption level, gradually increase their consumption, and declines once it has 
reached the maximum level. We also show that the optimal path is sensitive to the discount 
rate, the depreciation rate of the addiction level, but less sensitive to the price of the good. 
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The results of simulations provide the background for our experiment, which will be 
illustrated in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
ADDICTIVE CONSUMPTION AND TIME PREFERENCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL 
APPROACH 
 
In this chapter, we discuss an experiment designed to study the relationship between 
addictive consumption and time preference. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Individuals sometimes engage in short-term behavior that has long-term 
consequences.  These are the so-called intertemporal choice problems in economics. An 
important example on the negative side is the consumption of "addictive" substances such 
as alcohol or tobacco.  Addictive consumption has significant social welfare impacts. It 
does not only have financial consequences, but also can have severe health consequences.  
On the other hand, the underlying mechanisms for addictive behaviors are complicated. 
They range from some complex neurochemical mechanisms to various personality traits 
as well as social and economic influences. This paper attempts to decompose the addiction 
problem by providing the link between addictive behavior and time discounting.  
 
It has been well documented in the psychology literature that addictive consumption is 
positively related to impulsiveness. In the economics literature, however, there has not 
been a consensus on how addictive consumption is related to time preference. In particular, 
there are two elements in time preference, present bias and time discounting, which are 
likely to affect the consumption of negative addictive substances. Time discounting is 
characterized as the discounting factor over payoffs in the future. Present bias, on the other 
hand, is characterized as an overweighting of current payoffs relative to future payoffs. 
 
Specifically, economists consider “present-biased” preferences to work as 
follows.  Suppose someone would prefer $100 today to $120 in one month, but if the 
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decision period is moved into the future, would prefer $120 in two months over $100 in 
one month. That is, a person requires a larger compensation to wait for a larger payoff 
when the sooner payoff is “now”. 
 
Time discounting, on the other hand, works as follows. Suppose someone would prefer 
$100 today to $120 in one month; her time discounting rate would be the same as someone 
who would prefer $120 in two months over $100 in one month.  
 
Therefore, the above two factors, although similar, capture different aspects of an 
individual’s intertemporal preferences. It is unclear, though, which one plays the key role 
in addictive consumption and how they interact with each other. Although impulsiveness 
has been identified as one of the major causes of addictive consumption by psychologists 
and present bias is correlated with impulsiveness, the relationship between present bias 
and addictive consumption remain unclear. On the other hand, although time discounting 
has been related to addictive consumption through modeling by economists, there has not 
yet any experimental evidence on the relationship between addictive consumption and 
time discounting. Our study attempts to examine and distinguish the roles of those two 
factors play in decisions involving the consumption of negative addictive substances. 
 
It is our assumption that someone with high present-biased preference and low time 
discount will be more likely to engage in negative addictive behavior, and someone with 
low present-bias --whose preferences for $100 v. $120 a month apart are consistent --will 
be less likely to engage in negative addictive consumption. It is unclear though what would 
someone with low present-bias and high time discount and someone with high present-
bias and high time discount behave when it comes to addictive behavior. Table One 
summarizes our analysis above. 
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Table 1 The relationship between time discounting and addictive behaviors 
 High present-bias Low present-bias 
High time-discounting High negative addiction, 
low positive addiction 
Unclear 
Low time-discounting Unclear Low negative addiction, 
high positive addiction 
 
 
Theorists have adopted two different approaches to model addictive consumption. One is 
to model the addictive behaviors as a consequence of time inconsistent preference (Gruber 
& Koszegi, 2000; Richards & Hamilton, 2012). The other, following the classic model of  
Becker and Murphy (1988), assumes addicts have time consistent behaviors, but defines 
other characterizes to capture the features of addictive behaviors (Bernheim & Rangel, 
2004; Fudenberg & Levine, 2006; Laibson, 2001). Therefore, our paper also attempts to 
answer the question: do addictive behaviors involve time inconsistent preferences? 
 
To sum up, we raise the following two questions in this paper.  
1. Do addicts behave in a time consistent way? 
2. How do present-bias and time discounting affect addictive behaviors? 
 
As for the experimental setting, addictive behavior is approximated using an incentivized 
game, where a subject selects a "consumption" path (in this case for small amounts of 
money) over a number of periods in a lab experiment.  The game is calibrated so that there 
is a "best"(i.e., highest-earning) consumption path.  We anticipate that those with present-
biased preferences and/or high time discounting will be more likely to deviate from the 
best consumption path in the game by consuming too much too soon. Someone who does 
not exhibit this behavior will be more likely to enter into a consumption path involving 
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positive addiction (Note that no "addictive substances" are in any way involved in this 
study). 
 
We then use a different incentivized experimental task to assess time preference. This task 
involves real tradeoffs between smaller amounts of money at a sooner date, and larger 
amounts of money at a later date. There have been many different versions of time 
preference elicitation methods.  Our paper adopts a time preference measure developed by 
Arya et al. (2013). The details of the experiment setting will be explained in the 
experimental design session. 
 
Present-bias, on the other hand, does not have a standardized measurement in economic 
literature.  Although it has been argued that impulsiveness and impatience are the major 
drivers for present-bias (Rachlin & Raineri, 1992), there has been little empirical evidence 
due to the difficulty of testing it either in the lab or using real-world data. In this paper, 
we use an impulsiveness survey as a proxy for individuals’ present-bias. Although it is not 
the perfect measurement for present-bias, we believe it captures the essence of present-
bias by and large. 
 
It is also worth noting that there is a large number of psychology studies showing addictive 
behaviors are linked with the underlying personality trait impulsiveness. It is, however, 
less studied in the psychology literature how impulsiveness is linked with time preference 
and present-biased preference. Our study provides further evidence by connecting the 
underlying personality trait in psychology with economists’ approach to the same problem. 
 
Our paper adopts the experiment of Fehr and Zych (1998). The difference between their 
experiment and ours is they are only looking at subjects’ behaviors in the addiction game, 
while ours is testing the relationship between time preference and individual’s behaviors 
in the lab. 
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3.2 Experimental design  
The experiment includes two tasks. The first task is the addiction of Fehr and Zych (1998). 
In each period, the subjects are asked to choose how much to spend in each period of a 
30-period game. Their earnings in this experiment will be a function of their consumption 
in each period.  
 
In the second task, they are asked to make six choices between a smaller and sooner 
payment and a larger and later payment. The aim of the second task is to test their time 
preference. There have been many different versions of time preference elicitation 
methods.  Our paper adopts the Eckel time preference measure used in Arya et al. (2013). 
 
Eckel time preference measure consists of six choices. Each choice asks the subject to 
choose between a smaller payment at an earlier time and a larger payment at a later time. 
In our experiment, the earlier payment is fixed at 100 ECUs, where all ECUs will be paid 
in cash at an exchange rate of 1 ECU=0.1 dollar. The later payments are 101 ECUs, 105 
ECUs, 110 ECUs, 125 ECUs, 150 ECUs and 200 ECUs. The subject can choose either to 
be paid tomorrow or one month from tomorrow for the later payment. 
 
Finally, we will also ask subjects to answer a survey.  The survey consists of three parts: 
the first part is a demographic survey including questions about students’ financial status; 
the second part is a survey about addictive behaviors such as smoking and drinking; the 
third part is the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale survey. The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale is 
the most widely used questionnaire for the assessment of impulsiveness in psychology 
literature for 50 years (For review see Stanford et al. (2009)). The questionnaire contains 
30 questions asking things related to individual’s impulsiveness. Subjects will need to 
choose among the four scales: Never/Rarely, Occasionally, and Often, Always /Almost 
Always. A sample question would be “I plan for job security”. The screenshot of the 
survey questions are included in the appendix. 
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The payment scheme is as follows: at the end of the experiment, all subjects will be paid 
for task one and two subjects in each session are randomly selected to be paid for task two. 
The payoff they receive is equal to the show-up fee plus the payoff calculated based on 
their choices in the experiment. If they are chosen to be paid for task two, a check will be 
mailed to them at the address they provide to the experimenter at the date the subjects 
select.  
 
Experimental sessions were conducted at the Economics Research Lab in the Department 
of Economics. Subjects are recruited from the ERL subject database. Participation is open 
to all students enrolled in the subject pool, except that prior participants are excluded from 
further sessions. Subjects participate on computers with privacy partitions. There are 4 
sessions in total and each lasts from 30 minutes to 1 hour. The average earning per subject 
is 13 dollars. Below we provide some screenshots in the experiment. 
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Figure 9 Screenshot of the addiction game: decision screen 
 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the screenshot of the addiction game. This screenshot shows all the 
components of the subject’s decision making. The subject’s budget consists 10 points (top 
right), which can be spent to purchase consumption (left). Consumption earns ECS, which 
are translated to dollar earnings at the end. Total consumption so far determines “stock”; 
the higher the stock, the more “addicted” is the subject. The subject makes his or her 
purchasing decision by selecting one row in the table on the left and clicking the red button 
on the bottom of the left screen. Once they make their decisions, the account information 
on the right will change accordingly and show their account balance after the purchasing 
decisions are made as shown in Figure 10. The subject can then click confirm if they are 
satisfied with the change in their accounts or they can change their decisions by selecting 
a different row on the left of the screen. 
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Figure 10 Screenshot of the addiction game: confirmation screen 
 
 
 
The addiction game includes a practice round which subjects can end at any time at their 
own discretion and a real round in which they have to finish a 30-period new game. After 
the subjects complete the addiction game, they are directed to the second task. Figure 11 
provides a screenshot of the second task.  
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Figure 11 Screenshot of the time preference task 
 
 
 
In the second task, subjects are asked to make choices for Decisions 1 to 6. Each decision 
involves a choice between a sooner and smaller payment (100) and a larger and later 
payment. In each session, two subjects are chosen to be paid for task 2, and they will 
receive mail with a check inside at the date they choose (tomorrow or one month from 
tomorrow).  
 
3.3 Key variables and hypothesis 
There are a few key variables that we measure in the experiment. We want to use these 
variables to explain subjects’ intertemporal choices in the addiction game. 
 
TotalUtility is measured as the total amount subjects earn at the end of a 30-period 
addiction game. TotalUtility measures subjects’ intertemporal choices in the addiction 
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game. The highest earnings will be achieved by those who most closely match the optimal 
time path. 
 
Patience is measured as the number of times the subject chooses a larger, later payment in 
the time preference task, i.e., the number of patient choices. Someone with a high discount 
rate will have few patient choices. Therefore, the more patient a subject is, the higher his 
or her Patience is. 
 
Addiction is constructed using the sum of scores individuals we get from the addiction 
questionnaire. This provides a measure of their addictive behavior, especially drinking and 
smoking, as these are the most common addictive behaviors among college students. 
Specifically, there are in total seven questions asking individuals’ addictive behaviors. For 
example, how often do you have a drink containing alcohol? Subjects choose from never, 
less than monthly, two to four times a month, two to four times a week to four or more 
times a week. The more frequent they drink, the higher they score in this question. If they 
choose “never”, their score for this question is 0. If they choose “four or more times a 
week”, their score for this question is 4. The Addiction variable is obtained by adding each 
subject’s scores for each question measuring their addictive behaviors. The larger the 
Addiction variable is, the more addictive consumption the subjects engage in their 
everyday life according to their survey answers. 
 
There are six first-order factors measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale: Self-Control, 
Attention, Cognitive Instability, Motor, Perseverance and Cognitive Complexity. Each 
subscale is constructed by adding items contributing to each subscale in the survey. We 
construct them in a way that the higher each subscale is, the more impulsive the person is 
in that category, and create six corresponding variables for each subscale. There are 
NoSelfControl, InAttention, CognitiveInstability, Motor, NoPerseverance, 
CognitiveSimplicity.  
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Finally, there are a few demographic variables such as age, gender, whether the subject is 
a graduate student, whether the subject is Asian, and the amount of loans he is taking out 
in student loans.  
 
The follows are our two main hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: TotalUtility is negatively correlated with Addiction and the impulsiveness 
subscales; positively correlated with Time Preference.  
Since TotalUtility is a summary measure of subjects’ behaviors in the addiction game, and 
higher TotalUtility indicates better performance in the addiction game, or the less they 
become addictive in the game. Therefore, we anticipate TotalUtility to be negatively 
correlated with Addiction variable, which measures subjects’ addictive behaviors in their 
everyday life. On the other hand, the more addictive behavior a subject engages in, the 
more impulsive and the less patient the person should be, so TotalUtility should be 
negatively correlated with impulsiveness scales and positively correlated with Time 
Preference. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Patience is negatively correlated with Addiction. 
The more patient a subject is, the less addictive behaviors he or she engages in. Therefore, 
Patience should be negatively correlated with Addiction.  
 
3.4 Results  
Fifty one students from Texas A&M University participated in the experiment. Forty-three 
percent are graduate students in fields other than economics, and the others are 
undergraduate students. Forty percent are female students. The average age is 23. We first 
discuss each key variable in the experiment. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics and 
Figure 12 to Figure 14 show histograms of the key variables in the study.  
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
TotalUtility 51 80.06 15.77 35.52 105.9 
Patience 51 2.706 1.487 0 6 
NoSelfControl 51 11.49 3.009 6 20 
Age 51 22.59 2.325 19 29 
Male 51 0.608 0.493 0 1 
Grad 51 0.431 0.500 0 1 
Asian 51 0.529 0.504 0 1 
Addiction 51 13.08 5.295 8 41 
      
 
 
Next we look at the histogram of TotalUtility in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12 Histogram of TotalUtility   
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Figure 12 shows a histogram of subjects’ performance in the addiction game, revealing a 
distribution of a mean of 80, and a range of 35.5 to 105.9 (see Table 2). The standard 
deviation is 15.77.  The maximum total utility one can achieve is 117.7. About 12% of 
subjects achieve close to maximum earning. Performance is highly variable, with close to 
20% of subjects earns less than half of possible earnings.  
 
 
Figure 13 Histogram of time preference task 
 
 
 
A histogram shows the distribution of subjects’ time preference, which is measured by the 
number of patient (later, larger) choices in the time preference task. The distribution shows 
a range from 0 to 6 with a mean of 3.9. We are interested in the correlation between time 
preference and total utility as well as the correlation between time preference and the 
addiction variable from the survey data.  
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Figure 14 Histogram of addiction level 
 
 
 
A histogram of the survey measure of addiction level is shown on Figure 14. It is computed 
as a weighted sum of all the survey questions related to addictive consumption. The higher 
the addiction variable, the more addictive goods the subject consumes.  
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Figure 15 Histogram of Barratt Impulsiveness Subscales 
 
 
 
Figure 15 shows a combination of histograms of the six subscales we get from the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Survey.  
 
Table 3 and 4 shows pairwise correlations between total utility and time preference. This 
allows us to test our hypothesis. 
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Table 3 Pair-wise correlations including impulsiveness subscales4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Numbers on the second line of each row indicate the p-values. 
                 0.0107
CognitiveC~y     0.4095   1.0000 
              
              
Perseverance     1.0000 
                                
               Persev~e Cog~xity
              
                 0.0658   0.2465   0.9251   0.0086   0.5326   0.8559   0.0052
CognitiveC~y    -0.3015  -0.1926  -0.0158   0.4203   0.1045   0.0305   0.4447 
              
                 0.4676   0.6030   0.5789   0.4381   0.4782   0.5951   0.0017
Perseverance    -0.1215  -0.0871  -0.0929   0.1296  -0.1186   0.0890   0.4926 
              
                 0.9573   0.1365   0.2663   0.4562   0.9296   0.0639
       Motor    -0.0090  -0.2460   0.1849   0.1246   0.0148   0.3036   1.0000 
              
                 0.2715   0.0876   0.0905   0.2788   0.0358
CognitiveS~y    -0.1830  -0.2808   0.2785   0.1803   0.3416   1.0000 
              
                 0.0554   0.9439   0.1939   0.0000
   Attention    -0.3133   0.0118   0.2155   0.6400   1.0000 
              
                 0.0111   0.6936   0.9440
 SelfControl    -0.3528  -0.0565   0.0101   1.0000 
              
                 0.0698   0.0100
   Addiction    -0.2560  -0.3577   1.0000 
              
                 0.9463
TimePrefer~e     0.0097   1.0000 
              
              
TotalUtility     1.0000 
                                                                             
               TotalU~y TimePr~e Addict~n SelfCo~l Attent~n Cog~lity    Motor
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Table 4 Pair-wise correlations including demographic variables 
 
 
 
As we can see from the above tables, time preference is not significantly related to total 
utility, indicating that the patience level is not directly related to the overall performance 
in the addiction game. However, time preference is significantly negatively related to the 
addiction variable from the survey data (p<=.01). It indicates that there may be some latent 
variables that connect time preference and total utility. Addiction level has a marginally 
significant negative relation with total utility (p<=.10), suggesting at least to some extent, 
the behaviors in the addiction game is mimicking the consumption of addictive goods in 
the real world. 
 
              
              
       Asian     1.0000 
                       
                  Asian
              
                 0.6997   0.0377   0.1113   0.0063   0.0399   0.0399   0.0000
       Asian     0.0553   0.2919  -0.2257   0.3774   0.2887  -0.2887   0.7419 
              
                 0.4438   0.0714   0.1895   0.0000   0.1333   0.1333
        Grad    -0.1096   0.2546  -0.1867   0.6544   0.2131  -0.2131   1.0000 
              
                 0.4350   0.0785   0.8490   0.0508   0.0000
      Female    -0.1117  -0.2487  -0.0273  -0.2750  -1.0000   1.0000 
              
                 0.4350   0.0785   0.8490   0.0508
        Male     0.1117   0.2487   0.0273   0.2750   1.0000 
              
                 0.1163   0.0546   0.7916
         age    -0.2227   0.2708  -0.0379   1.0000 
              
                 0.0698   0.0100
   Addiction    -0.2560  -0.3577   1.0000 
              
                 0.9463
TimePrefer~e     0.0097   1.0000 
              
              
TotalUtility     1.0000 
                                                                             
               TotalU~y TimePr~e Addict~n      age     Male   Female     Grad
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Other demographic variables include age, gender, dummy variables for graduate student 
and Asian, the amount of student loans and part-time working hours. None of them are 
significantly related to TotalUtility. Among the six subscales, self-control is positively 
correlated with total utility. 
 
To have a closer look at results for task 1, we compare the optimal path with the actual 
consumption on average in the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 16 Average of actual paths for all main rounds and optimal path 
 
 
 
From Figure 16, one can tell that actual path deviates from the optimal path significantly. 
The optimal consumption is gradually increasing. Most subjects overconsume at the 
beginning periods and under consume towards the end. 
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3.5 Regression analysis   
Our next step is to find out to what degree subjects’ behaviors in the addiction game are 
determined by the key variables defined in the experiment. To this end, we use a linear 
regression model to study subjects’ behaviors in the addiction game. The dependent 
variable is total utility; the independent variables are time preference, self-control, age, 
dummies for gender, graduate students, and Asian students. As shown in the table below, 
addiction is negatively related to total utility, No self-control is negatively related to total 
utility.  
 
 
Table 5 Total utility determinants, OLS regression 
 
 
 
When we add the demographic variables, the results are still robust although R-square 
becomes larger. None of the democratic variables are significantly correlated with total 
utility.  
 
Next, we take a look at the consumption path for each individual subjects in Figure 17. 
 
. 
                                           * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                           
                               N                    51            51      
                               R2                  0.12          0.26     
                                                (10.75)**      (5.37)**   
                               _cons             101.630       163.318    
                                                                (0.69)    
                               Asian                            4.451     
                                                                (0.22)    
                               Grad                             -1.693    
                                                                (0.96)    
                               Female                           -4.307    
                                                               (2.06)*    
                               Age                              -2.609    
                                                 (2.61)*       (3.11)**   
                               NoSelfControl      -1.852        -2.185    
                                                  (0.08)        (0.21)    
                               Patience           -0.109        0.307     
                                                                           
                                               TotalUtility  TotalUtility 
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Figure 17 Individual consumption path in addiction game 
 
 
 
The above graph shows that there are significant individual differences in the consumption 
path. Therefore, we divide the subjects into different groups to further exploit their 
behaviors. First, we drop those observations that end the addiction game before period 15. 
It leaves us with 41 observations. A regression on these 41 observations give us the 
following results. From the table, we can see that all signs are preserved and the main 
conclusion does not change. 
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Table 6 Total utility determinants, subgroup OLS regression 
 
 
 
To sum up, we find that there is no significant correlation between individuals’ 
performance in the addiction game and their time preference. The subjects’ performance 
in the addiction game is negatively correlated with their addictive consumption level 
according to the survey results. Their time preference is also negatively correlated with 
their addictive consumption level. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper provides the first direct evidence of the relationship between time preference 
and intertemporal choices of addictive consumption. By connecting individuals’ behaviors 
in an incentivized intertemporal choice game with their choices in a time preference task, 
it shows that the above two variables are not directly correlated. On the other hand, 
individuals’ choice in the time preference task is significantly correlated with the addictive 
consumption level elicited from their answers in the survey questions. It suggests that the 
addictive consumption in the everyday life is a complicated procedure. Our next step is to 
decompose this procedure so that one can tell which part is determined by intertemporal 
decision making and which part of it is determined by other variables. 
                                           * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                           
                               N                    41            41      
                               R2                  0.14          0.19     
                                                (11.85)**      (3.59)**   
                               _cons             103.171       122.710    
                                                                (0.19)    
                               Asian                            -1.224    
                                                                (0.22)    
                               Grad                             -1.667    
                                                                (1.24)    
                               Female                           -5.639    
                                                                (0.46)    
                               Age                              -0.674    
                                                 (2.45)*       (2.42)*    
                               NoSelfControl      -1.628        -1.703    
                                                  (0.31)        (0.32)    
                               Patience           -0.436        -0.490    
                                                                           
                                               TotalUtility  TotalUtility 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this dissertation, I mainly discuss the relationship between time preference and 
addictive consumption. To this end, I adopt both the theoretical approach and the 
experimental approach. By imposing an induced utility function of the rational addiction 
model on subjects, we are able to identify some of the key components of subjects’ 
behaviors in the addiction game, and therefore imply their addictive consumption in the 
real life. Then I construct a general equilibrium model to study the taxation problem of 
addictive goods and how it is related to the other sources of externalities of addictive 
consumption. 
 
Some of my main conclusions are: 
1. Addictive consumption is positively related to impulsiveness, but not significantly 
related to the patience level. 
 
2. The addiction game captures some features of the addictive consumption and is 
useful in terms of studying individuals’ addictive behaviors. 
 
The next step is to develop a general equilibrium model of consumption of addictive goods. 
As we can tell from the experimental results, the model should be based on the assumption 
that individuals give extra weight to well-being now over well-being at any future moment. 
It leads to over consumption of addictive goods and provides room for government 
regulation. Besides, an optimal taxation rule incorporating the internality issue caused by 
addicts could be derived. Therefore, an optimal tax rate should incorporate all three 
aspects of inefficiency. Compared with previous literate that focus on consumer's problem, 
the optimal tax rate should be lower when taking into consideration the impact of 
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imperfect competition in highly concentrated market. It may even be possible that an 
optimal tax is negative if the last effect completely offset the first two.  
 
Lastly, there are several ways that I can extend the model. First, government regulation of 
addictive consumption is not only limited to taxation, but also certain restrictions on time 
and location, or complete illegalization. Therefore, it is possible to compare the welfare 
impact of different policy instrument and find the optimal policy instrument or 
combination over consumption of addictive goods. Second, we assume consumers are 
fully aware of their time-inconsistent problem. However, it is possible that consumers do 
not fully anticipate their self-control problem at the time of making consumption decisions. 
In fact, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) assume there are two types of consumers: nave 
who is unaware of future self-control problem; sophisticated who is aware of future self-
control problem; and found different consumption patterns of different type of consumers. 
It is also interesting to see the impact of incorporating naive consumers in the model. 
Finally, numerical calibration is needed to examine the optimal tax rate given the market 
concentration, and the externality and internality of certain addictive good. 
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APPENDIX  
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